1.0 Introduction
American Space disasters resulting in three or more deaths is this reports focal point with a specific focus on the causes of the Apollo 204 (Apollo 1), the Challenger Space Shuttle and the Columbia Space Shuttle disasters. It will also investigate the recommendations put after the mission failures. It is important to cover these mission failures because they have the greatest number of American astronaut fatalities (three or more). This report is for the general public’s information and in memory of the astronauts who passed away.
2.0 Discussion
2.1 Past Disasters
Apollo 1 was scheduled for launch during February 1967; however, on January 27th a fire during a pre-launch test claimed the lives of all three crew members (Thompson , et al., 1967).
The Challenger space shuttle was launched January 28th 1986 from the John F. Kennedy Space Center. The disintegration of the vehicle occurred 73 seconds after lift-off causing the deaths of all seven crew members (Rogers, et al., 1986) .
The Columbia space shuttle was launched from the John F. Kennedy Space Center on the 16th of January 2003. On February 1st 2003 it disintegrated over Texas and Louisiana, during re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere causing the deaths of all seven crew members (Gehman, et al., 2003) .
2.2 Causes of the failed missions
Thompson et al (1967) tell us that the ignition source in Apollo 1 was never officially determined. However, the most probable ignition cause was identified as an “electrical arc occurring near the floor in the lower forward section of the left hand equipment bay” (paragraph 1) this area was where the environmental control system (ECS) was located. See Figure 1 in appendix. Thompson et al (1967) also states that a three phase fire occurred in the command module with flammable material allowing the fire to spread rapidly throughout the module with temperatures surpassing 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. The doctors present speculated that the three crew members died due to “smoke inhalation leading to unconsciousness and deaths occurred soon thereafter” (Anderson, et al., 1968, p.5).
The Challenger space shuttle vehicle broke apart shortly after lift-off due to a failure of an O-Ring in the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) failing at lift off (Rogers, et al., 1986) . See Figure 2 in the appendix. Harwood (1986) reveals that 73 seconds after initial lift-off, the vehicle disintegrated due to a flame coming through the failed joint in the SRB and impinging on the external tank, this flame eventually caused a rupture in the side of the External Tank (ET) which then disintegrated. Reports from Harwood (1986) and Rogers et al. (1986) state that the shuttle which was now under extreme aerodynamic loads of up to 20g was torn apart instantly being unable to withstand the pressure.
Approximately 82 seconds after lift-off a piece of debris hit the thermal insulation tiles of the Columbia shuttle causing a hole around 15-25cm in size, (Gehman, et al., 2003) . The debris was a piece of thermal insulation foam from the External tank (ET) structure. See Figure 3 in appendix. During the re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere hot gasses penetrated the interior wing through the hole damaging the integrity of the structure (USA Today, 2003) . The superheated air continued to penetrate the wing melting the aluminium structure of the shuttle until the shuttle was torn apart by increasing aerodynamic forces being placed upon it (Gehman, et al., 2003) .
2.3 Recommendations implemented upon failed missions
Thompson et al (1967) suggested in the Apollo 204 review that after the disaster certain things should be changed about the Apollo programme because “Once the Command Module has left the Earth’s environment the occupants are totally dependent upon it for their safety” (paragraph 1). The hatch which had previously opened inward was redesigned to open outward in under 10 seconds allowing for a much quicker exit in case of an emergency (Hart, Walkover, & Zosky, 1970) . As a result of the suggestions made by Thompson et al (1967) all flammable materials in the module were replaced with self extinguishing materials, and all plumbing and wiring were covered in insulation.
Rogers, et al (1986) stated in the Challenger disaster report that “The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal must be replaced” (p.198) also stated is that the new design could replace the need for a joint or be a complete redesign. Fletcher (1986) tells us that in response NASA initiated a complete redesign of the SRB’s, NASA also created a new office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance, headed by a NASA administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator.
Gehman, et al (2003) stated in the Columbia disaster report that a program needed to be put in place to eliminate all ET debris being shed on lift-off. After the disaster NASA implemented a shuttle contingency program called the Launch on Need (LON) missions. Another safety implementation was that the harnesses on the remaining shuttles be upgraded, due to the safety harnesses malfunctioning during the violent re-entry Columbia Crew Survival Investigation commission (2008).
3.0 Conclusion
3.1 In conclusion the failures of Apollo 1, the Challenger space shuttle and the Columbia space shuttle were all tragedies that claimed the lives of 17 people.
3.2 Each one had its individual faults causing the eventual disaster.
3.3 In each accident the underlying cause was deemed to be different.
3.4 As a result, the implementations have led to a successful return to space flight.
4.0 Recommendations
4.1 When reading up on this topic more the reader should not compare the Apollo and space shuttle programs or vehicles due to their vast differences.
4.2 I also recommend that people interested in this topic research other disasters for their own merits as no two disasters are exactly the same.
Reference List
Anderson, C. P., Russel, R. B., Magnuson, W. A., Syminton, S., Stenns, J., Young, S. M., et al. (1968). Report of the Committee On Aeronatical and Space Sciences United States Senate with additional views Apollo 204 Accident. Washintgton D.C: Government Printing Office.
Columbia Crew Survival Investigation commission. (2008 ). Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. Washington D.C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Fletcher, J. C. (1986). Report to the President, Actions to impelment the recommendations of the presidential comission on the space shuttle challenger accident. Washington, D. C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Gehman, H. W., Barry, J. L., Deal, D. W., Hallock, J. N., Hess, K. W., Hubbard, S., et al. (2003). Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Washington D.D: Government Printing Office.
Hart, R. J., Walkover, L. J., & Zosky, E. W. (1970). The Apollo Command Module Side Access Hatch System. JPL TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 33-425 , 157-168.
Harwood, W. (1986). Chapter 13: The Timeline. Retrieved September 12, 2010, from Voyage Into History: http://web.archive.org/web/20060504192732/www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lchap13timeline.html
Rogers, W. P., Armstrong, N., Acheson, D. C., Covert, E. E., Feynman, R. P., Hotz, R. B., et al. (1986). Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington D.C: Government Printing office.
Thompson , F. L., Frank, C., Barton, G., White, G. C., Van Dolah, R. W., Williams, J. J., et al. (1967). Apollo 204 Review Board Final Report. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office.
USA Today. (2003, March 4). Molten aluminum found on Columbia's thermal tiles. Retrieved September 13, 2010, from USATODAY.Com: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-03-04-shuttle-investigation_x.htm
