Final Report.

1.0 Introduction

American Space disasters resulting in three or more deaths is this reports focal point with a specific focus on the causes of the Apollo 204 (Apollo 1), the Challenger Space Shuttle and the Columbia Space Shuttle disasters. It will also investigate the recommendations put after the mission failures. It is important to cover these mission failures because they have the greatest number of American astronaut fatalities (three or more). This report is for the general public’s information and in memory of the astronauts who passed away.  

2.0 Discussion

2.1 Past Disasters

Apollo 1 was scheduled for launch during February 1967; however, on January 27^th a fire during a pre-launch test claimed the lives of all three crew members (Thompson , et al., 1967).

The Challenger space shuttle was launched January 28^th 1986 from the John F. Kennedy Space Center. The disintegration of the vehicle occurred 73 seconds after lift-off causing the deaths of all seven crew members (Rogers, et al., 1986).

The Columbia space shuttle was launched from the John F. Kennedy Space Center on the 16^th of January 2003. On February 1^st 2003 it disintegrated over Texas and Louisiana, during re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere causing the deaths of all seven crew members (Gehman, et al., 2003).

2.2   Causes of the failed missions

Thompson et al (1967) tell us that the ignition source in Apollo 1 was never officially determined. However, the most probable ignition cause was identified as an “electrical arc occurring near the floor in the lower forward section of the left hand equipment bay” (paragraph 1) this area was where the environmental control system (ECS) was located. See Figure 1 in appendix. Thompson et al (1967) also states that a three phase fire occurred in the command module with flammable material allowing the fire to spread rapidly throughout the module with temperatures surpassing 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. The doctors present speculated that the three crew members died due to “smoke inhalation leading to unconsciousness and deaths occurred soon thereafter” (Anderson, et al., 1968, p.5).

The Challenger space shuttle vehicle broke apart shortly after lift-off due to a failure of an O-Ring in the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) failing at lift off  (Rogers, et al., 1986). See Figure 2 in the appendix. Harwood (1986) reveals that 73 seconds after initial lift-off, the vehicle disintegrated due to a flame coming through the failed joint in the SRB and impinging on the external tank, this flame eventually caused a rupture in the side of the External Tank (ET) which then disintegrated. Reports from Harwood (1986) and Rogers et al. (1986) state that the shuttle which was now under extreme aerodynamic loads of up to 20g was torn apart instantly being unable to withstand the pressure.

Approximately 82 seconds after lift-off a piece of debris hit the thermal insulation tiles of the Columbia shuttle causing a hole around 15-25cm in size, (Gehman, et al., 2003). The debris was a piece of thermal insulation foam from the External tank (ET) structure. See Figure 3 in appendix. During the re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere hot gasses penetrated the interior wing through the hole damaging the integrity of the structure (USA Today, 2003). The superheated air continued to penetrate the wing melting the aluminium structure of the shuttle until the shuttle was torn apart by increasing aerodynamic forces being placed upon it (Gehman, et al., 2003).  

2.3 Recommendations implemented upon failed missions

Thompson et al (1967) suggested in the Apollo 204 review that after the disaster certain things should be changed about the Apollo programme because “Once the Command Module has left the Earth’s environment the occupants are totally dependent upon it for their safety” (paragraph 1). The hatch which had previously opened inward was redesigned to open outward in under 10 seconds allowing for a much quicker exit in case of an emergency (Hart, Walkover, & Zosky, 1970). As a result of the suggestions made by Thompson et al (1967) all flammable materials in the module were replaced with self extinguishing materials, and all plumbing and wiring were covered in insulation.

Rogers, et al (1986) stated in the Challenger disaster report that “The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal must be replaced” (p.198) also stated is that the new design could replace the need for a joint or be a complete redesign. Fletcher (1986) tells us that in response NASA initiated a complete redesign of the SRB’s, NASA also created a new office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance, headed by a NASA administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator.

Gehman, et al (2003) stated in the Columbia disaster report that a program needed to be put in place to eliminate all ET debris being shed on lift-off. After the disaster NASA implemented a shuttle contingency program called the Launch on Need (LON) missions. Another safety implementation was that the harnesses on the remaining shuttles be upgraded, due to the safety harnesses malfunctioning during the violent re-entry Columbia Crew Survival Investigation commission (2008).

3.0              Conclusion

3.1              In conclusion the failures of Apollo 1, the Challenger space shuttle and the Columbia space shuttle were all tragedies that claimed the lives of 17 people.

3.2              Each one had its individual faults causing the eventual disaster.

3.3              In each accident the underlying cause was deemed to be different.

3.4              As a result, the implementations have led to a successful return to space flight.

4.0      Recommendations

4.1              When reading up on this topic more the reader should not compare the Apollo and space shuttle programs or vehicles due to their vast differences.

4.2              I also recommend that people interested in this topic research other disasters for their own merits as no two disasters are exactly the same.

                               Reference List

Anderson, C. P., Russel, R. B., Magnuson, W. A., Syminton, S., Stenns, J., Young, S. M., et al. (1968). Report of the Committee On Aeronatical and Space Sciences United States Senate with additional views Apollo 204 Accident. Washintgton D.C: Government Printing Office.

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation commission. (2008 ). Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. Washington D.C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Fletcher, J. C. (1986). Report to the President, Actions to impelment the recommendations of the presidential comission on the space shuttle challenger accident. Washington, D. C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Gehman, H. W., Barry, J. L., Deal, D. W., Hallock, J. N., Hess, K. W., Hubbard, S., et al. (2003). Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Washington D.D: Government Printing Office.

Hart, R. J., Walkover, L. J., & Zosky, E. W. (1970). The Apollo Command Module Side Access Hatch System. JPL TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 33-425 , 157-168.

Harwood, W. (1986). Chapter 13: The Timeline. Retrieved September 12, 2010, from Voyage Into History: http://web.archive.org/web/20060504192732/www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lchap13timeline.html

Rogers, W. P., Armstrong, N., Acheson, D. C., Covert, E. E., Feynman, R. P., Hotz, R. B., et al. (1986). Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington D.C: Government Printing office.

Thompson , F. L., Frank, C., Barton, G., White, G. C., Van Dolah, R. W., Williams, J. J., et al. (1967). Apollo 204 Review Board Final Report. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office.

USA Today. (2003, March 4). Molten aluminum found on Columbia's thermal tiles. Retrieved September 13, 2010, from USATODAY.Com: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-03-04-shuttle-investigation_x.htm

Final Essay! Fingers Crossed!

The mainstreaming of children with special needs should be done on a case by case basis. This essay will discuss the pros and cons of mainstream education for children with special needs and the various levels of help required by each child. It will exploring the social stigmatization and attitudes towards special needs children in mainstream education, specialized teachers and resources to fit each child’s needs and how government funding changes might affect mainstream therapists.

 A case study by Caswell, McDonald, MacArthur & Simmons Carlsson (2007) tells us about Simon (18 years old) who had previously attended a regular school “but had been withdrawn because the school seemed unable to meet his needs” (p.126) Simon is now enrolled in a self-contained school which matches his needs better. Another case study of Ian (11 Years Old) who was moved to an intermediate with an attached unit for special needs students said “…at the other school I was the only one with a walker...” (p.130) at his current school there are many others with walkers or wheelchairs “…I know I wont be looked at like I am completely from, from planet mars or something…” (p.130). During the observation period Ian would spend a great deal of time away from class which lead to his teacher voiceing a concern about the amount of work he was missing while at therapy sessions.

Kimi Ora School is a Special needs school in Wellington that aims to provide the best for the students enrolled (Stevens, 2009). At the beginning of 2011 Kimi Ora will be split into two satellite units like the one attended by Ian; one at Evans bay intermediate and the other at Naenae intermediate. It is hoped that at Evans Bay intermediate, which already has an impressive special needs unit, will continue help with good integration and the reduction of social stigmatization (Roy, 2010). 

A report by the Human Rights Commission (2008) tells us that is often detrimental towards children with special needs with classmates or staff often being patronizing or openly discriminatory. However, both Coie & Pennington (1976) and Hazzard (1983) show that children in some cases may gain better understandings of special needs as they grow older (Encyclopedia of special education, 2001).

The definition of mainstreaming in education is the placing of students with special needs in a regular class (MSN encarta, 2009). Wolfberg & Schuler (1999) tell us that the mainstreaming of children with special needs can provide them with the ability to learn some social skills through observation. However, there are still problems for special needs students in mainstream education including; the feeling of being socially rejected by their classmates, becoming targets for bullying or them becoming embarrassed at the level of extra help needed to partake in activities as stated by Jacques, Wilton, & Townsend (1998).

A study conducted by Semmel, Abernathy, Butera, & Lesar (1991) discovered that teachers believed that "full time placement of students with mild disabilities will not have positive social benefits for these students". Reynolds, Martin-Reynolds, & Mark (1982) state that the teachers attitude towards special needs children is the most important thing for sucsessfull mainstreaming to occur. In an address to the Auckland Disability Law Workshop in 2010 the Associate Minister of Education, Heather Roy, said...

Wherever I go I hear about the need for teacher training in special education - how important it is for families to have teachers who know how to work in partnership with them and support a child with a disability to learn. I hear about the need for professional development for all teachers so students with special needs can have their needs met irrespective of the class they are in or the subjects they choose.

Not having enough specialized teachers for special needs student’s means some may miss out on valuable learning time.

Smith (2009) wrote that with the 2009 budget the government decided the country can no longer afford the $2.5 million a year to fund therapy services for hundreds of children. Therapists in mainstream schools may not be able to provide the level of help needed to improve the quality of life for certain students because of these funding cuts. The education minister, Anne Tolley, has moved this therapists' budget to a $51 million funding pool to allow more children to access grants from ORRS (On-going and Reviewable Resourcing Schemes). ORRS is a government run program that provides resources for a very small number of students who have the highest level of special needs during the student’s school years (Ministry of Education, 2010). Roy (2010) states that parent’s cannot continue to rely on funding raises to provide the improvements they are demanding in the future.

Children with special needs often face different challenges in mainstream education due to social differences and negative attitudes from others towards them. To widely implement it there needs to be a case by case assessment and given the that child’s individual needs a decision should be made between the government, parents and the student as to what is best for the education of that child. The changed of government funding for special needs education may mean in the future specialized education (therapists and teachers) may not be available for those that need it.

Reference List

Clark, P., McDonald, T., MacArthur, J., Simmons Carlsson, C., & Caswell, P. (2007). Research project on Intergrated Effective Service Provision for Children and Young people with Physical Disabilities: Two Part Research Project. New Zealand: Ministry of Education.

Coie, J., & Pennington, B. (1976). Childrens perceptions of deviance and Disorder. Child Development , 407-413.

Encyclopedia of special education. (2001). A reference for the education of the handicapped and other exceptional children and adults (Vol. 2). (C. R. Reynolds, & L. Mann, Eds.) New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Hazzard, A. (1983). Childrens experiance with, knowledge of and attitudes towards disabled persons. Journal of Special Education , 2 (17), 131-139.

Jacques, N., Wilton, K., & Townsend, M. (1998). Cooperative learning and social acceptance of children with mild intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research , 29-36.

Ministry of Education. (2010, September 15). NZ Education. Retrieved September 27th, 2010, from ORRS Guidelines: http://www.minedu.govt.nz/NZEducation/EducationPolicies/SpecialEducation/FormsAndGuidelines/ORRSGuidelines/The_Ongoing_and_Reviewable_Resourcing_Schemes.aspx

MSN encarta. (2009). Dictionary . Retrieved September 7, 2010, from MSN encarta: http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/mainstreaming.html

Reynolds, B. J., Martin-Reynolds, J., & Mark, F. D. (1982). Elementary teachers attitudes towards mainstreming educable of mentally retarded students. Education and Traning Of The Mentally Retarded.(3), 171-177.

Roy, H. (2010, Febuary 4th). The review of special education in New Zealand. Retrieved September 7, 2010, from Scoop Independant News: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1002/S00160.htm

Smith, J. (2009, August 3rd). NZ Herald. Retrieved Seotember 27th, 2010, from Special education centre threatened by funding cuts: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10588300

Semmel, M.I., Abernathy, T.V., Butera, G. & Lesar, S. (1991). Teacher perceptions of the Regular Education Initiative. Exceptional Children(58), 9-24.

Stevens, D. (2009). Kimi Ora School. Retrieved September 27th, 2010, from Kimi Ora School: http://www.kimiora.school.nz/about.html

Wolfberg, P. J., & Schuler, A. L. (1999). Fostering peer interaction, imaginative play and spontaneous language in children with autism. Child Language Teaching & Therapy , 41-52.