1. Introduction
American Space disasters (with three or more deaths) is the focal point of this report with a specific focus on the causes of the Apollo 204 (Apollo 1), the Challenger Space Shuttle and the Columbia Space Shuttle disasters. It will also investigate the recommendations put in place for a safe return to flight. It is important to cover these mission failures because they have the highest number of American astronaut fatalities (three or more). This report is for the general public’s information and in memory of the astronauts who passed away.
2. Subtopics
2.1 Past Disasters
Apollo 1 which was planned for launch during February 1967. However, on January 27th a fire during a pre-launch test claimed the lives of Virgil Grissom, Edward H. White and Roger B. Chaffee.
The Challenger space shuttle was launched on January 28th 1986 from the John F. Kennedy Space Center. The disintegration of the vehicle occurred 73 seconds after lift-off causing the deaths of all seven crew members; Francis Scobee, Michael Smith, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald McNair, Christina McAuliffe, Gregory Jarvis and Judith Resnik.
The Columbia space shuttle was launched from the John F. Kennedy Space Center on the 16th of January 2003. On February 1st 2003 it disintegrated over Texas and Louisiana, during re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere causing the deaths of all seven crew; Rick D. Husband, William C. McCool, Michael P. Anderson, Ilan Ramon, Kalpana Chawla, David M. Brown, Laurel Clark.
2.2 Causes of the failed missions
The cause of the fire (ignition source), in Apollo 1 was never officially determined by the report board However, the most probable ignition cause was identified as an “electrical arc occurring near the floor in the lower forward section of the left hand equipment bay”, (Thompson , et al., 1967). This area was where the environmental control system (ECS) was located. The board (1968) also states that a three phase fire occurred in the command module with flammable material allowing the fire to spread rapidly throughout the module with temperatures passing 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. The doctors present speculated that the three crew members lost their lives due to “smoke inhalation leading to unconsciousness and deaths occurred soon thereafter” (Anderson, et al., 1968).
The Challenger space shuttle vehicle broke apart shortly after lift-off due to a failure of an O-Ring in the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) failing at lift off (Rogers, et al., 1986). Harwood (1986) reveals that 73 seconds after initial lift-off the vehicle disintegrated due to a flame coming through the failed joint in the SRB and impinging on the external tank, this flame eventually caused a rupture in the side of the External Tank (ET) which then disintegrates. Reports from both Harwood (1986) and Rogers et al. (1986) state that the shuttle which was now under extreme aerodynamic loads of up to 20g was torn apart instantly being unable to withstand the pressure.
Approximately 82 seconds after lift-off, of Columbia, a piece of debris hit the thermal insulation tiles and made a hole around 15-25cm in size, (Gehman, et al., 2003). The debris was a piece of thermal insulation foam from the External tank (ET) structure. During re-entry, in to Earths atmosphere, the shuttle hot gasses penetrated the interior wing through the hole damaging the integrity of the structure (USA Today, 2003). The superheated air continued to penetrate the wing melting the aluminium structure of the shuttle until “increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter (Vehicle).” (Gehman, et al., 2003)
2.3 Recommendations implemented for a safe return to flight:
The Apollo 204 review board (Thompson , et al., 1967) suggested, after the disaster, that certain things should be changed about the Apollo programme because “Once the Command Module has left the Earth’s environment the occupants are totally dependent upon it for their safety”. After the disaster the program halted for changes to be made to the command module to make it safer. The hatch which had previously opened inward was redesigned to open outward in under 10 seconds allowing for a much quicker exit should in case of an emergency (Hart, Walkover, & Zosky, 1970). All flammable materials in the module were replaced with self extinguishing materials, and all plumbing and wiring were covered in insulation.
The Challenger disaster report (Rogers, et al., 1986) stated that “The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal must be replaced” it also states that the new design could either replace the need for a joint or be a complete redesign. In response NASA initiated a complete redesign of the SRB’s, NASA also created a new office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance, headed by a NASA administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator. (Fletcher, 1986)
The Columbia disaster report (Gehman, et al., 2003) said that a program needed to be put in place to eliminate all External Tank debris being shed on lift-off. After the disaster NASA implemented a shuttle contingency program called the Launch on Need (LON) missions. Another safety implementation made at the request of the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation commission (2008) was that the harnesses on the remaining shuttles have been upgraded, due to the safety harnesses malfunctioning during the violent re-entry.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion the failures of Apollo 1, the Challenger space shuttle and the Columbia space shuttle were all tragedies that claimed the lives of 17 people. Each one had its individual faults causing to the eventual disaster. In each accident the underlying cause was deemed to be different. All of the above recommendations have lead to a successful return to flight of their program’s the space shuttle has now had 19 flights without disaster since Columbia was lost. The Apollo program went on to have 14 missions without disaster.
4. Recommendations
When repeating this report, for future reference look for a more specific range like the Apollo or space shuttle program individually comparing them together it becomes too difficult comparing the similarities in disasters with the vast differences in orbiter.
5. References
Anderson, C. P., Russel, R. B., Magnuson, W. A., Syminton, S., Stenns, J., Young, S. M., et al. (1968). Report of the Committee On Aeronatical and Space Sciences United States Senate with additional views Apollo 204 Accident. Washintgton D.C: Government Printing Office.
Columbia Crew Survival Investigation commission. (2008 ). Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. Washington D.C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Fletcher, J. C. (1986). Report to the President, Actions to impelment the recommendations of the presidential comission on the space shuttle challenger accident. Washington, D. C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Gehman, H. W., Barry, J. L., Deal, D. W., Hallock, J. N., Hess, K. W., Hubbard, S., et al. (2003). Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Washington D.D: Government Printing Office.
Hart, R. J., Walkover, L. J., & Zosky, E. W. (1970). The Apollo Command Module Side Access Hatch System. JPL TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 33-425 , 157-168.
Harwood, W. (1986). Chapter 13: The Timeline. Retrieved September 12, 2010, from Voyage Into History: http://web.archive.org/web/20060504192732/www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lchap13timeline.html
Rogers, W. P., Armstrong, N., Acheson, D. C., Covert, E. E., Feynman, R. P., Hotz, R. B., et al. (1986). Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington D.C: Government Printing office.
Thompson , F. L., Frank, C., Barton, G., White, G. C., Van Dolah, R. W., Williams, J. J., et al. (1967). Apollo 204 Review Board Final Report. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office.
USA Today. (2003, March 4). Molten aluminum found on Columbia's thermal tiles. Retrieved September 13, 2010, from USATODAY.Com: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-03-04-shuttle-investigation_x.htm
